“The fundamental question is whether the use of the [covered] vehicle was itself the cause of the injury.” Ruiz v. Farmers Ins. Co., 177 Ariz. 101, 104, 865 P.2d 762, 765 (1993) . To recover under the insurance policy, the injured party must show that the covered “vehicle caused and produced [the] injury, not that it merely facilitated [the] injury.” Id. at 103, 865 P.2d at 764 .

In determining a coverage question involving the use of a vehicle, the Arizona Supreme Court explained: “The insurance is to pay for the negligent acts of the insured committed during the operation or use of the motor vehicle . . . . It should be emphasized: Liability arises out of negligent acts in the use of motor vehicles which proximately cause the accident and injuries.” Morari v. Atlantic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Ariz. 537, 538, 468 P.2d 564, 565 (1970) . In other words, “even though the causal relationship between the motor vehicle and the accident does not have to be the proximate cause of the accident, the accident must be caused by a negligent act in the use of the motor vehicle.” Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 585, 588, 694 P.2d 1199, 1202 (App. 1983) , modified on other grounds, 143 Ariz. 567, 694 P.2d 1181 (1985) .

Asylum is a complex issue because people have many different reasons for leaving their homeland and not all asylum seekers warrant protection from another government. A person who leaves a country in which people are routinely tortured or killed for their political or religious beliefs may seem at first blush a prime candidate for asylum. If, however, that person was one of the torturers and merely wishes to avoid imprisonment when a new government takes over, asylum may not be justified. For this and other reasons, the process of obtaining asylum is a complicated one involving a series of interviews and paperwork that to many can seem daunting.
The history of asylum in the United States goes back to the days when America was still a group of British colonies. Roman Catholics, Jews, and certain Protestant sects (such as the Quakers from England and the Huguenots from France) sailed to America to seek the freedom to practice their religion without fear of recrimination. Historically, the United States has stood stands as a symbol of freedom and has attracted persecuted men and women from other shores. At times, the influx has been so great that legal restrictions have had to be imposed. Historical events, such as World Wars I and II, revolutions in other countries, and the attacks in New York and Washington D. C. on September 11, 2001, also play a role in how, when, and to whom asylum is granted.

A person who has been granted asylum b is free to remain in the United States. and will not be returned to his or her home country. That same person entering the United States. as an illegal alien, with no fear of persecution from another country, can be removed from the United States. This explains why some people attempt to seek asylum when in fact they have no need for this protection.

The U.S. Government is quick to point out that admission to the United States is a privilege, not a right, and DHS has developed a series of regulations and guidelines for handling asylum or potential asylum cases.

Individuals who seek asylum in the United States must meet the definition of “refugee” as provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act: essentially, a refugee is anyone who is either unwilling or unable to return to his or her home country because persecution (or well-founded fear of persecution) on the basis of race, religion, or social or political beliefs awaits the individual.

A person can apply for asylum at a port of entry into the United States (ports of entry include air-ports, seaports, and border crossings) or any time up to one year from the date of entry.  After the requisite form is filled out, it must be sent to a processing center (which center depends on the place from which it is mailed.) All questions on the form must be answered, even if the answer is “none” or “unknown.” If even one question is left blank, the entire form will be deemed incomplete and mailed back to the applicant. Applicants who do not speak English must find a competent translator to complete the form;DHS does not supply translation services.
Applicants who wish to go to work while waiting for their application to be approved must wait 150 days from the date the application was accepted by INS. Accepting work also requires filling out a separate Employment Authorization Form.

Once the application has been received and processed, the applicant will be called in for an interview with an asylum officer. Applicants are allowed to bring legal counsel and witnesses to the interview. (As with the application, the asylum seeker is responsible for providing a translator if he or she does not speak English.) Usually the asylum officer will issue a decision that will be reported to the applicant at a later date, although officers sometimes announce their decision at the end of the interview.

The asylum officer may decide to refer an application to an Immigration Judge for a final decision. If the judge denies the application, the asylum seeker will get a letter explaining how to appeal.

A derivative asylum application that is denied cannot be appealed, but the person who made the application may submit a motion to reopen or reconsider the case. A motion to reopen must be accompanied by new documentation that could change the decision. A motion to reconsider, however, needs to show that the denial was based on incorrect application of the law or of DHS policy.

Asylum law and the procedures are complex, involved in seeking and getting protection are complex and the process of seeking asylum can leave people confused at a particularly vulnerable time. A competent and qualified lawyer should be consulted before asylum proceedings begin.  If you or someone you know needs legal assistance with an asylum claim, please call us immediately at 480-456-3080 to set up a consultation with a qualified attorney.

FACT SHEET FOR S.B. 1070
Purpose

Requires officials and agencies of the state and political subdivisions to fully comply with and assist in the enforcement of federal immigration laws and gives county attorneys subpoena power in certain investigations of employers.  Establishes crimes involving trespassing by illegal aliens, stopping to hire or soliciting work under specified circumstances, and transporting, harboring or concealing unlawful aliens, and their respective penalties.

Background

Federal law provides that any alien who 1) enters or attempts to enter the U.S. at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers, 2) eludes examination by immigration officers, or 3) attempts to enter or obtains entry to the U.S. by a willfully false or misleading representation is guilty of improper entry by an alien.  For the first commission of the offense, the person is fined, imprisoned up to six months, or both, and for a subsequent offense, is fined, imprisoned up to 2 years, or both (8 U.S.C. § 1325).

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the primary authority for enforcing immigration laws.  ICE was created in March 2003 as an investigative branch of the Department of Homeland Security.  ICE was the result of combining the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs Service.

Current statute defines criminal trespass in the first degree as a person knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in areas related to residential structures, residential yards, real property subject to a valid mineral claim or lease under certain circumstances, property if the person defaces religious symbols or religious property, or critical public service facilities.  Depending on the circumstances, criminal trespass in the first degree provides penalties ranging from a class 1 misdemeanor to a class 6 felony (A.R.S. § 13-1504).

In 2007, Arizona enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), prohibiting an employer from knowingly or intentionally employing an unauthorized alien and establishing penalties for employers in violation.  The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services office administers the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) Program.  The SAVE Program, together with the Social Security Administration (SSA), administers E-Verify, which allows employers to electronically confirm the employment eligibility of all newly hired employees.  LAWA requires all Arizona employers to use E-Verify to verify the employment eligibility of new hires.  Proof of verifying the employment authorization of an employee through E-Verify creates a rebuttable presumption that an employer did not intentionally or knowingly employ an unauthorized alien.
The fiscal impact is unknown; however, there may be additional costs associated with criminal prosecution and detention of persons who are accused and convicted of the crimes established in this legislation.  Additionally, the addition of new fines associated with this measure may also have an impact.

Provisions

Enforcement

1.      Requires a reasonable attempt to be made to determine the immigration status of a person during any legitimate contact made by an official or agency of the state or a county, city, town or political subdivision (political subdivision) if reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the U.S.

2.      Requires the person’s immigration status to be verified with the federal government pursuant to federal law.

3.      Requires an alien unlawfully present in the U.S. who is convicted of a violation of state or local law to be transferred immediately to the custody of ICE or Customs and Border Protection, on discharge from imprisonment or assessment of any fine that is imposed.

4.      Allows a law enforcement agency to securely transport an alien who is unlawfully present in the U.S. and who is in the agency’s custody to:

a)      a federal facility in this state or
b)      any other point of transfer into federal custody that is outside the jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency.

5.      Allows a law enforcement officer, without a warrant, to arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the U.S.

6.      Prohibits officials or agencies of the state and political subdivisions from being prevented or restricted from sending, receiving or maintaining an individual’s immigration status information or exchanging that information with any other governmental entity for the following official purposes:

a)      determining eligibility for any public benefit, service or license provided by any federal, state, local or other political subdivision of this state;
b)      verifying any claim of residence or domicile if that verification is required under state law or a judicial order issued pursuant to a civil or criminal proceeding in the state;
c)      confirming a detainee’s identity; and
d)     if the person is an alien, determining whether the person is in compliance with federal alien registration laws.

7.      Disallows officials or agencies of the state or political subdivisions from adopting or implementing policies that limit immigration enforcement to less than the full extent permitted by federal law, and allows a person to bring an action in superior court to challenge an official or agency that does so.

8.      Requires the court, if there is a judicial finding that an entity has committed a violation, to order any of the following:

a)      that the plaintiff recover court costs and attorney fees;
b)      that the defendant pay a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 for each day that the policy has remained in effect after the filing of the action.

9.      Requires the court to collect and remit the civil penalty to the Department of Public Safety (DPS), which must establish a special subaccount for the monies in the account established for the Gang and Immigration Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission (GIITEM) appropriation.

10.  Specifies that law enforcement officers are indemnified by their agencies against reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney fees, incurred by the officer in connection with any action, suit or proceeding brought pursuant to this statute to which the officer may be a party by reason of the officer being or having been a member of the law enforcement agency, except in relation to matters in which the officer is adjudged to have acted in bad faith.

Trespassing by Illegal Aliens

11.  Specifies that, in addition to any violation of federal law, a person is guilty of trespassing if the person is:

a)      present on any public or private land in the state and
b)      is not carrying his or her alien registration card or has willfully failed to register.

12.  Requires, in the enforcement of this statute, the final determination of an alien’s immigration status to be determined by:

a)      a law enforcement officer who is authorized to verify or ascertain an alien’s immigration status or
b)      a law enforcement officer or agency communicating with ICE or the U.S. Border Protection.

13.  Stipulates that a person is not eligible for suspension or commutation of sentence or release on any basis until the sentence imposed is served.

14.  Directs the person to pay jail costs and an additional assessment of at least $500 for the first violation or at least $1,000 for subsequent offenses.

15.  Requires the court to collect and remit the assessments to DPS for the special GIITEM subaccount.

16.  Specifies that the trespassing statute does not apply to a person who maintains authorization from the federal government to remain in the U.S.

17.  Classifies the violation as follows:

a)      a class 2 felony if the person commits the violation while in possession of a dangerous drug, precursor chemicals used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine, a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or property that is used for committing an act of terrorism;
b)      a class 4 felony for a second or subsequent offense or if the person, within 60 months before the violation, accepted a voluntary removal from the U.S. or has been deported;
c)      a class 1 misdemeanor in all other cases.

Unlawful Stopping and Solicitation of Work

18.  Specifies that it is unlawful, if a motor vehicle is stopped on a street, roadway or highway and blocks or impedes the normal movement of traffic:

a)      for a motor vehicle occupant to attempt to hire or hire and pick up passengers for work at a different location;
b)      for a person to enter the motor vehicle in order to be hired by a motor vehicle occupant and to be transported to work at a different location.

19.  Stipulates that it is unlawful for a person who is unlawfully present in the U.S. and who is an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in Arizona.

20.  Classifies these offenses as class 1 misdemeanors.

21.  Defines solicit and unauthorized alien.

Unlawful Transporting

22.  Specifies that it is unlawful for a person to do or attempt to do the following if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien has come to, has entered or remains in the U.S. in violation of law:

a)      transport or move an alien in Arizona in a means of transportation;
b)      conceal, harbor or shield an alien from detection in any place in Arizona, including any building or means of transportation.

23.  Stipulates it is unlawful to encourage or induce an alien to come to or reside in Arizona if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that such coming to, entering or residing in this state is or will be in violation of law.

24.  Subjects a means of transportation used in the commission of a violation to mandatory vehicle immobilization or impoundment.

25.  Classifies these offenses as class 1 misdemeanors and subjects offenders to fines of at least $1,000, except that a violation that involves 10 or more illegal aliens is a class 6 felony with a fine of at least $1,000 for each alien who is involved.

Investigations of Employers

26.  Allows the county attorney, in investigations of employers who are alleged to have knowingly or intentionally hired unauthorized aliens, to take evidence, administer oaths or affirmations, issue subpoenas requiring attendance and testimony of witnesses and cause depositions to be taken.

27.  Exempts proceedings held during the course of a confidential investigation from open meeting laws.

28.  Stipulates that an employer is not entrapped in an investigation if the employer was predisposed to knowingly or intentionally employ an unauthorized alien and law enforcement officers or their agents merely provided the employer with an opportunity to do so.

29.  States that it is not entrapment for law enforcement officers or their agents merely to use a ruse or to conceal their identities.

30.  Directs employers to keep verification records of their employees’ work eligibility through E-Verify.

31.  Establishes a class 3 felony for failing to:

a)      verify employment eligibility through E-Verify or
b)      keep records of verifications.

Miscellaneous

32.  Specifies that monies in the special GIITEM subaccount are subject to legislative appropriation for distribution for gang and immigration enforcement and for county jail reimbursement costs relating to immigration.

33.  Stipulates that the terms of the act regarding immigration have the meanings given to them under federal immigration law.

34.  Requires the act to be implemented in a manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens.

35.  Contains intent and severability clauses.

36.  Titles the legislation the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act.”

37.  Makes conforming changes.

38.  Becomes effective on the general effective date.

BREAKDOWN OF ALL CRASHES IN ARIZONA
TOTAL 106,767

• FATAL 709
• INJURY 33,380
• PROPERTY DAMAGE ONLY 72,678
• URBAN 84,941
• RURAL 21,826
• ALCOHOL RELATED 5,854
• PEDESTRIAN 1,523
• PEDALCYCLE 1,995
• MOTORCYCLE 2,958
• SINGLE VEHICLE 19,116
• MULTI-VEHICLE 87,651

BREAKDOWN OF FATAL CRASHES IN ARIZONA

• TOTAL 709
• ALCOHOL RELATED 244
• URBAN 299
• RURAL 410
• SINGLE VEHICLE 320
• MULTI-VEHICLE 389
• ALCOHOL RELATED SINGLE VEHICLE 116
• ALCOHOL RELATED MULTI-VEHICLE 128

BREAKDOWN OF PERSONS KILLED AND INJURED

• IN ALL CRASHES: KILLED 806; INJURED 50,610
• IN ALCOHOL RELATED CRASHES: KILLED 261 INJURED 4,142
• IN URBAN CRASHES: KILLED 325 INJURED 39,656
• IN RURAL CRASHES: KILLED 481 INJURED 10,954
• USING SAFETY DEVICE: KILLED 221 INJURED 39,995
• NOT USING SAFETY DEVICE: KILLED 321 INJURED 4,152
• DRIVERS AGE 24 OR YOUNGER: KILLED 80 INJURED 8,098
• DRINKING DRIVERS AGE 24 OR YOUNGER: KILLED 35 INJURED 543

BREAKDOWN OF CRASHES BY TIME

• PEAK MONTH FOR ALL CRASHES DECEMBER
• PEAK DAY FOR ALL CRASHES FRIDAY
• PEAK HOUR FOR ALL CRASHES 4 PM – 5 PM
• PEAK MONTH FOR FATAL CRASHES APRIL
• PEAK DAY FOR FATAL CRASHES SATURDAY
• PEAK HOUR FOR FATAL CRASHES 6 PM – 7 PM
• PEAK HOUR FOR ALCOHOL RELATED CRASHES 2 AM – 3 AM
• PEAK HOUR FOR FATAL ALCOHOL RELATED CRASHES 9 PM – 10 PM and 3 AM – 4 AM
• PEAK HOUR FOR MOTORCYCLE CRASHES 5 PM – 6 PM
• PEAK HOUR FOR FATAL MOTORCYCLE CRASHES 4 PM – 5 PM and 7 PM – 8 PM

OTHER FACTS

• MOST COMMON MANNER OF COLLISION Rear-End
• MOST COMMON DRIVER VIOLATION Speed too fast for conditions

Arizona at a Glance – 2009

• Approximately 2.21 persons were killed each day.
• One person was killed every 10.88 hours.
• There were 138.56 persons injured every day.
• One person was injured every 10.39 minutes.
• Alcohol Related crashes accounted for 5.48% of all crashes and 34.41% of all fatal crashes.
• Of all alcohol related crashes, 75.78% occurred in Urban areas and 24.22% occurred in
  Rural areas, while 44.26% of all alcohol related fatal crashes occurred in Urban areas and
  55.74% occurred in Rural areas.
• Single vehicle crashes accounted for 17.90% of all crashes and 45.13% of all fatal crashes.
  Of all Pedestrian crashes, 7.94% were fatal while 1.25% of Pedalcycle crashes were fatal.
  Crashes which occurred during daylight hours (6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.) accounted for 73.2%
  of all crashes.
• Motor vehicle crashes resulted in $2.757 billion in economic losses to Arizona.
• Children age 14 and younger accounted for 43 fatalities and 4,093 injuries in motor vehicle crashes.

This program also provides services designed to stabilize a family in crisis and to preserve the family unit by reducing safety and risk factors. This program provides an array of services, Family Group Decision Making, Family Preservation Services (Intensive Family Services), High-Risk Infant Services (in Maricopa County), case management, parent aide and other in-home family support services. Not all programs are offered in every geographic area. In addition, services to promote permanence, stability and continuity of care are provided for children who enter out-of-home care. Services include, but are not limited to case management, permanency planning, provision of out-of-home care, kinship foster care, adoptive and foster home recruitment, other out-of-home services to individuals or families, and assistance to young adults in transition from adolescence to adulthood.

Arizona state law gives Child Protective Services (CPS) the authority to protect and to aid children who are at risk in their own homes. These same laws provide safeguards for the rights of children and their parents. Law enforcement officers and CPS specialists may remove a child from the parents if a child is suffering or will imminently suffer abuse or neglect, or for a medical or psychological examination to determine if the child has been abused or neglected. Parents whose children have been removed from the home are given a Temporary Custody Notice within six hours. If a dependency petition is filed, parents are notified of the date, time and location court will review the temporary custody of their children. Children and parents have the right to receive services to promote timely reunification as a family.

When Child Protective Services (CPS) receives an abuse or neglect report that meets the criteria for response, a local CPS specialist is assigned to interview the child’s siblings, other children in the home and others who may have information about the child’s safety including family, parents, neighbors, teachers, doctors and friends. After all information is gathered, the CPS specialist and a supervisor review the available facts and the next steps to take. A determination of services will be made to reduce the present risk to the child.

Following investigation, the CPS team determines if the report should be substantiated or unsubstantiated. When a report is substantiated it means that the information gathered supports a finding of child abuse or neglect. CPS may provide services to the family or refer them to services in the local community. When a report is unsubstantiated it means that the information gathered does not support a finding of child abuse or neglect. CPS may end its involvement with the family unless the family requests additional help. A confidential record of all CPS reports and outcomes is maintained in a computer database.

CPS reports are confidential and can be released only to those individuals and agencies authorized by law (A.R.S. 8-807 and 41-1959). This form is to be used by persons who believe that a report has been made about them. Parents may request a report on behalf of their children and legal guardians may request reports on behalf of the child. This form is not to be used to release other types of legally authorized information.

• Request for Child Protective Services Report (243 KB DOC)

• Request for Child Protective Services Report-Spanish Version (272 KB DOC)

Child Protective Services (CPS) records and files are confidential and can be released only to those individuals and agencies authorized by law (A.R.S. 8-807 and 41-1959). This form may be used by a parent; guardian; custodian; a child; a person who is the subject of CPS information; a prospective adoptive parent; foster parent; or an attorney representing any of these persons pursuant to A.R.S 8-807.

• Child Protective Services Records Request (196 KB DOC)

• Child Protective Services Records Request-Spanish Version (222 KB DOC)

Child Protective Services (CPS) Information
Regarding Children Who Have Died or Nearly Died of Abuse or Neglect (Maltreatment)

Effective September 26, 2008, changes to state law established a detailed process for the Department of Economic Security (DES) to release Child Protective Services (CPS) records related to children who have died or nearly died as a result of abuse or neglect. If CPS receives a report that a child has died or nearly died as a result of abuse or neglect on or after September 26, 2008, the preliminary information will be posted on this page. If additional records on those cases are subsequently requested and released, information about accessing those records also will be posted on this page.

The Department is using a new format to post information on child fatalities and near fatalities that were due to abuse, abandonment or neglect. This format is designed to provide more preliminary information about circumstances of the death or near death.

The Department began posting information about child fatalities and near fatalities on the website on September 26, 2008, when A.R.S. § 8-807, the law governing CPS information, was changed.

Based on public suggestions received over the past year, the Department determined that this revised format would better inform the public about these cases.

The Department is also posting child fatalities and near fatalities that were determined to be the result of abuse or neglect if neither law enforcement nor CPS have identified the perpetrator.

The table below contains information released in the current month.

Child Fatalities/Near Fatalities Information Releases
September 2010

9/10/2010    Near Death of a Child from Maltreatment    Basic Information (10 KB PDF)
9/07/2010    Death of a Child from Maltreatment    Basic Information (10 KB PDF)
9/07/2010    Near Death of a Child from Maltreatment    Basic Information (10 KB PDF)

children and the ability of parents to pay.

2.   To make child support orders consistent for persons in similar circumstances.

3.   To give parents and courts guidance in establishing child support orders and to promote settlements.

4.   To comply with state law (Arizona Revised Statutes, Section 25-320) and federal law
(42 United States Code, Section 651 et seq., 45 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 302.56) and any amendments thereto.
Appendix to A.R.S. §25-320: Arizona Child Support Guidelines, Section 1.

In any action to modify child support, whether temporary or permanent, the amount resulting from application of the Arizona Child Support Guidelines guidelines shall be the amount of child support ordered. These include, without limitation, all actions or proceedings brought under Title 25 of the Arizona Revised Statutes in which a child support order is established or modified. However, if application of the guidelines would be inappropriate or unjust in a particular case, the court shall deviate from the guidelines in accordance with Section 20.  Appendix to A.R.S. §25-320: Arizona Child Support Guidelines, Section 3.

Section 5(E) of the Arizona Child Support Guidelines, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-320 app. (2007), implements the policy that both parents, regardless of their employment status, must provide appropriately for their children’s reasonable needs. The section allows a court to attribute hypothetical income and expenses to protect a working parent from paying a disproportionate amount of the total support obligation when the other parent has chosen not to earn income to the extent he or she is able. Section 5(E) requires the court to consider the manner in which a parent’s decision not to work (and the consequent reduction in income available for child support) will affect the children, and to weigh that impact against the benefits of the parent’s choice. The benefits must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and the court may consider such factors as whether the decision is (1) designed to enhance future earning capacity; (2) places the children in financial peril; (3) allows a parent more needed time at home with his or her children; and (4) appropriate in view of the individual needs of a particular child.

Section 5(E) of the Arizona Child Support Guidelines, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-320 app. (2007).
Section 20 of the Arizona Child Support Guidelines (A): The court shall deviate from the guidelines, i.e., order child support in an amount different from that which is provided pursuant to these guidelines, after considering all relevant factors, including those set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes Section 25-320, and applicable case law, only if all of the following criteria are met:
1. Application of the guidelines is inappropriate or unjust in the particular case,
2. The court has considered the best interests of the child in determining the amount of a deviation. A deviation that reduces the amount of child support paid is not, by itself, contrary to the best interests of the child,
3. The court makes written findings regarding 1. and 2. above in the Child Support
Order, Minute Entry or Child Support Worksheet,
4. The court shows what the order would have been without the deviation,and
5. The court shows what the order is after deviating.
ARIZONA PRECEDENT CASE LAW REGARDING DEVIATIONS
The guidelines and criteria for deviation from them shall be based on all relevant factors, including:

• The financial resources and needs of the child.
• The financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
• Excessive or abnormal expenditures by the parties, and
• The factors set forth in A.R.S. §25-320A.

Gallegos v. Gallages, 174 Ariz. 18, 846 P.2d 831 (Ariz. App. 1992).
In Gallegos, the fact that the father became a paraplegic as a result of a severe spinal cord injury, coupled with the fact that he required a lifetime of physical therapy and medical services, warranted a deviation in the child support guidelines due to abnormal expenditures in the form of medical treatment and the medical needs of the father, according to the Arizona Court of Appeals.  Id.

In the Arizona Court of Appeals case, Pearson v. Pearson, the ex-wife was awarded custody of the minor children in prior divorce proceedings and the ex-husband was to pay child support, but the ex-wife requested additional child support payments based on the ex-husband’s income, which she alleged was significantly more than her own. The trial court had a difficult time figuring the ex-husband’s income because he owned a company and had many expenses paid by the company. The trial court considered these payments by the company, and ordered a significant upward modification in child support payments. On appeal, the court found that the upward modification was proper, as the money received from the ex-husband’s company was properly deemed the ex-husband’s income. This included amounts received for car and rental allowances, and payments by the company to satisfy debts of the ex-husband. The Superior Court of Maricopa County (Arizona) modified a child support award per the request of appellee ex-wife and thereby required appellant ex-husband to pay additional child support to his ex-wife. The Court of Appeals affirmed the modification based on the income amounts calculated by benefits received from father’s business. Pearson v. Pearson, 190 Ariz. 231, 946 P.2d 1291 (1997).

In the Arizona Court of Appeals decision in Hetherington v. Hetherington, the court found that the inclusion as income of employment benefits, which may obligate a parent to pay child support based on income that he does not really have available to spend, is a valid concern that may be considered by the family court in determining the appropriate amount of child support in any case. Hetherington v. Hetherington, 220 Ariz. 16, 202 P.3d 481 (2008); See In re Marriage of Schlafly, 149 Cal. App. 4th 747, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 281 (App. 2007). The court further held that, in a case in which benefits artificially inflate a parent’s income, the court may consider a deviation from the child support guidelines.  Hetherington, supra.

2. The wishes of the children as to the custodian.

3. The interaction and interrelationship of the children with the children’s parent or parents, the children’s siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the children’s best interest.

4. The children’s adjustment to home, school and community.

5. The mental and physical health of all individuals involved

6. Which parent is more likely to allow the children frequent and meaningful continuing contact with the other parent. This paragraph does not apply if the court determines that a parent is acting in good faith to protect the children from witnessing an act of domestic violence or being a victim of domestic violence or children abuse.

7. Whether one parent, both parents or neither parent has provided primary care of the children.

8. The nature and extent of coercion or duress used by a parent in obtaining an agreement regarding custody.

9. Whether a parent has complied with chapter 3, article 5 of this title.

10. Whether either parent was convicted of an act of false reporting of children abuse or neglect under section 13-2907.02.

11. Whether there has been domestic violence or children abuse as defined in section 25-403.03.

12.  Whether the relocation is being made or opposed in good faith and not to interfere with or to frustrate the relationship between the children and the other parent or the other parent’s right of access to the children.

13. The prospective advantage of the move for improving the general quality of life for the custodial parent or for the children.

14. The likelihood that the parent with whom the children will reside after the relocation will comply with parenting time orders

15. Whether the relocation will allow a realistic opportunity for parenting time with each parent.

16. The extent to which moving or not moving will affect the emotional, physical or developmental needs of the children.

17. The motives of the parents and the validity of the reasons given for moving or opposing the move including the extent to which either parent may intend to gain a financial advantage regarding continuing children support obligations.

18. The potential effect of relocation on the children’s stability.

However, when the property damaged is the subject of a contract or warranty, a typical feature of product liability and defective construction cases, the question arises whether the plaintiff’s claims, if any, should sound in contract or tort. E.g., Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 375, 694 P.2d 198, 205 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Phelps v. Firebird Raceway, Inc., 210 Ariz. 403, 111 P.3d 1003 (2005); Woodward v. Chirco Constr. Co., 141 Ariz. 514, 515, 687 P.2d 1269, 1270 (1984).

This issue is resolved on a case-by-case basis with the court analyzing the purposes of the respective bodies of law and applying whichever law is most appropriate. Salt River, 143 Ariz. at 375-76, 694 P.2d at 205-06; Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Sam’s Plumbing, LLC, 220 Ariz. 512, 514 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).

Contract law protects the expectation that the parties will receive the benefits of their bargain and encourages the efficient private ordering of liabilities by allowing parties to negotiate and distribute their respective responsibilities, while tort law promotes safety and protects personal and property rights by imposing a baseline duty of care. See id.; Carstens, 206 Ariz. 123, P 10, 75 P.3d at 1084. Accordingly, in the context of property damage, contract law focuses on standards of quality as defined by the contracting parties; tort law on the objective reasonableness of certain conduct and the actual harm it causes. Carstens, 206 Ariz. 123, P 10, 75 P.3d at 1084; Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Sam’s Plumbing, LLC, 220 Ariz. 512, 514 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).

With these principles in mind, the Arizona Supreme Court has directed Arizona courts to consider three non-dispositive factors to determine whether tort or contract law should apply to a particular claim: (1) the nature of the defect causing loss, (2) how the loss occurred, and (3) “the type of loss for which the plaintiff seeks redress.” Salt River, 143 Ariz. at 376, 694 P.2d at 206. The first factor turns on whether quality or safety concerns are primarily implicated. See id. at 376-77, 694 P.2d at 206-07. The second factor looks to whether the loss results from a slow deterioration or a sudden accident or calamity. See id. at 377-78, 694 P.2d at 207-08.

If damage occurs suddenly and accidentally and the defect poses an unreasonable risk of danger to people or other property, the claim will sound in tort, even if, as in Salt River, the only property damaged is the defective product itself. See id; Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Sam’s Plumbing, LLC, 220 Ariz. 512, 514 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). In the Valley Forge case, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that there was no reason to bar Valley Forge’s tort action under the economic loss rule because the work done by the contractor not only fell below the quality standards specified in the contract, but the work presented an extreme risk of danger to everyone and everything around the subject piping.

The Arizona Supreme Court provided a list of factors, not a bright-line test, for determining whether to apply tort or contract law to a given situation when property has been damaged. 143 Ariz. at 376, 379-80, 694 P.2d at 206, 209-10 (“Each case must be examined to determine whether the facts preponderate in favor of the application of tort law or commercial law exclusively or a combination of the two.”). And Carstens overlooks that one of the factors articulated by the court as relevant to a determination of whether a property damage claim sounds in tort is the dangerousness of the defect. Salt River, 143 Ariz. at 376, 694 P.2d at 206.

The public policy goals of the economic loss rule is to assure that contract law does not “drown in a sea of tort” and to encourage parties to efficiently negotiate the distribution of potential liabilities arising from their contractual relationships. Delaval, 476 U.S. at 866. But, as our supreme court’s extensive discussion of the problem in the context of products liability aptly demonstrates, the law of tort also pursues important societal goals. Salt River, 143 Ariz. at 376-78, 694 P.2d at 206-08 (emphasizing role of tort law in protecting public and “preventing accidents by deterring the distribution of unsafe products”).

In the Flagstaff decision, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that, rather than rely on the economic loss doctrine to preclude tort claims by non-contracting parties, courts should instead focus on whether the applicable substantive law allows liability in the particular context. For example, whether a non-contracting party may recover economic losses for a defendant’s negligent misrepresentation should depend on whether the elements of that tort are satisfied, including whether the plaintiff is within the limited class of persons to whom the defendant owes a duty. Cf. Donnelly, 139 Ariz. at 189, 677 P.2d at 1297 (recognizing that defendants may be liable for pecuniary losses incurred by certain third parties based on defendant’s negligent misrepresentations); Restatement (Second) of Torts ? 552 (1977) (same). This Flagstaff decision, however, was completely devoid of any analysis with respect to contracts entered into by an unlicensed contractor through the use of fraud (i.e. consumer fraud).

Note:  This Act, properly interpreted, requires that a minimum amount of coverage be available to each person actually injured or killed; to the extent it is not so available, each person who sustains bodily injury has a claim against his or her uninsured motorist coverage. Herring v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 144 Ariz. 254, 697 P.2d 337 (1985).   This section was intended to close the gap in protection offered by the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, § 28-1101  et seq., by requiring insurance companies issuing automobile liability policies to include coverage for injuries suffered by their insureds for damages caused by uninsured motorists. Bartning v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 164 Ariz. 370, 793 P.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1990),  review denied, 166 Ariz. 432, 803 P.2d 425 (1991);  Lowing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 Ariz. 101, 859 P.2d 724 (1993).
Limitations on Underinsured Coverage:   Under this section, underinsured motorist coverage is applicable only for the difference between an insured’s total damages and the total applicable liability limits. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Arrington, 192 Ariz. 255, 963 P.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1998).  A passenger cannot recover from a single tortfeasor covered by a single policy under both the liability and underinsured provisions of the policy. Duran v. Hartford Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 125, 755 P.2d 430 (Ct. App. 1988),  aff’d, 160 Ariz. 223, 772 P.2d 577 (1989).
NOTE:  Underinsured motorist coverage is now no longer mandatory. Cole v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Ariz. 578, 703 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1985).

General Commercial Liability Policy:
Under a business auto coverage policy purchased in connection with a general commercial liability policy, a vehicle owned by an employee and used in the business was a “specifically insured motor vehicle” under subsection L. Petrusek v. Farmers Ins. Co., 193 Ariz. 552, 975 P.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1998). Because a business auto coverage policy purchased in connection with a general commercial liability policy was not intended to be primary coverage for a vehicle owned by an employee and used in the business, the insurer was not required to offer underinsured motorist coverage in connection therewith. Petrusek v. Farmers Ins. Co., 193 Ariz. 552, 975 P.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1998).

Ownership, Maintenance or Use:    An unidentified accident-causing driver is an “owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle” within the meaning of this section. Lowing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 Ariz. 101, 859 P.2d 724 (1993).

Territory Limits:  Arizona’s public policy dictates that uninsured motorist coverage be territorially coextensive with liability coverage; any territorial limitation to the contrary violates that public policy and is void. Bartning v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 162 Ariz. 344, 783 P.2d 790 (1989).

Stacking: Nothing in the underinsurance statute suggests any legislative intent to allow an injured passenger to “stack” liability and underinsured motorist coverage so as to, in effect, increase the named insured’s liability coverage. Duran v. Hartford Ins. Co., 160 Ariz. 223, 772 P.2d 577 (1989).

A. Every insurer writing automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policies must make available to the named insured and by written notice offer the insured and at the request of the insured must include within the policy uninsured motorist coverage which extends to and covers all persons insured under the policy, in limits not less than the liability limits for bodily injury or death contained within the policy. The selection of limits or rejection of coverage by a named insured or applicant on a form approved by the director is valid for all insureds under the policy. The completion of such form is not required where the insured purchases such coverage in an amount equal to the limits for bodily injury or death contained in the policy. The offer need not be made in the event of the reinstatement of a lapsed policy or the transfer, substitution, modification or renewal of an existing policy. At the request of the insured, the insured may purchase and the insurer shall then include within the policy uninsured motorist coverage that extends to and covers all persons insured under the policy in any amount up to the liability limits for bodily injury or death contained within the policy but not less than the limits prescribed in section 28-4009 .

Subsection A makes it mandatory to offer both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in at least the amount of the statutory minimium for liability insurance. Cole v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Ariz. 578, 703 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1985).

Written Requirement:  Where an insurance agent handed a form to the insured, asked her to sign it if she wanted coverage, and then retained the form, a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the agent intentionally or negligently engaged in conduct that did not make underinsured coverage available and did not by written notice offer such coverage because the insured was led to believe she was simply signing an application for insurance. Giley v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 168 Ariz. 306, 812 P.2d 1124 (Ct. App. 1991).

B. Every insurer writing automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policies shall also make available to the named insured thereunder and shall by written notice offer the insured and at the request of the insured shall include within the policy underinsured motorist coverage which extends to and covers all persons insured under the policy, in limits not less than the liability limits for bodily injury or death contained within the policy. The selection of limits or rejection of coverage by a named insured or applicant on a form approved by the director shall be valid for all insureds under the policy. The completion of such form is not required where the insured purchases such coverage in an amount equal to the limits for bodily injury or death contained in the policy. The offer need not be made in the event of the reinstatement of a lapsed policy or the transfer, substitution, modification or renewal of an existing policy. At the request of the insured, the insured may purchase and the insurer shall then include within the policy underinsured motorist coverage that extends to and covers all persons insured under the policy in any amount authorized by the insured up to the liability limits for bodily injury or death contained within the policy.

The purpose of subsection B is to require insurance companies to make increased amounts of protection available against the uninsured motorist; there is no indication that the legislature intended this section to redefine uninsured. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Eden, 136 Ariz. 460, 666 P.2d 1069 (1983). The intent of the uninsured motorist insurance statute is to protect each insured no matter where he is (within the policy’s territorial limits) or what he is doing. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. McKeon, 159 Ariz. 111, 765 P.2d 513 (1988).

The amendment to subsection B in 1981 manifested a clear legislative intent that each insured who purchased uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of liability coverage would have available the total of the two coverages in cases in which the injury was caused by two negligent drivers. Any attempt, by contract or otherwise, to reduce any part of this amount violates the statute. Spain v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 189, 731 P.2d 84 (1986).

The intent of the phrase “which extends to and covers all persons insured under the policy” from subsection B is that each person insured under a policy is entitled to underinsured coverage (if purchased) if and when a person insured under the policy suffers bodily injury or death, but only to the extent of the policy limits applicable to the person who was injured and/or killed in an automobile accident. Green ex rel. Green v. Mid-America Preferred Ins. Co., 156 Ariz. 265, 751 P.2d 581 (1987).

C. Any insurer writing automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policies may make available the coverages required by subsections A and B of this section to owners and operators of motor vehicles that are used as public or livery conveyances or rented to others or that are used in the business primarily to transport property or equipment. The provisions of subsections A and B of this section shall not preclude an insurer writing automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policies in this state from requiring that all motor vehicles that are owned by or registered to the named insured and that are insured by the same insurer or group of insurers under a common management have the same limits of coverage for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in amounts as selected or rejected by the named insured.

Under subsection C, an insurer is required to make written offers of underinsured motorist coverage in limits up to the bodily injury liability limits of its existing insureds’ policies upon offering to renew such policies; however, the insurer is not required to prove that its insureds actually received and expressly rejected them. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ash, 181 Ariz. 167, 888 P.2d 1354 (Ct. App. 1994).

D. ”Uninsured motor vehicles”, subject to the terms and conditions of that coverage, includes any insured motor vehicle if the liability insurer of the vehicle is unable to make payment on the liability of its insured, within the limits of the coverage, because of insolvency.

E. ”Uninsured motorist coverage”, subject to the terms and conditions of that coverage, means coverage for damages due to bodily injury or death if the motor vehicle that caused the bodily injury or death is not insured by a motor vehicle liability policy that contains at least the limits prescribed in section 28-4009. For the purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, an uninsured motorist does not include a person who is insured under a motor vehicle liability policy that complies with section 28-4009.

Subsection E provides that when there is a deficiency, it is underinsured, not uninsured coverage, which makes up the difference between the amount received from the insured tortfeasor and the statutory minimum. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 172 Ariz. 458, 837 P.2d 1193 (Ct. App. 1992).

F. Any payment made under the bodily injury liability portion of a motor vehicle liability policy insuring the motor vehicle that caused the bodily injury or death in an amount equal to or less than the per person or per occurrence bodily injury limits of that policy, regardless of the number of persons receiving payments, precludes any payment under the uninsured motorist coverage based upon the fault of the person who is insured under the motor vehicle liability policy.

G. ”Underinsured motorist coverage” includes coverage for a person if the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury or death liability bonds and liability insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the total damages for bodily injury or death resulting from the accident. To the extent that the total damages exceed the total applicable liability limits, the underinsured motorist coverage provided in subsection B of this section is applicable to the difference.

Subsection G did not create a cause of action unknown at common law; instead, it merely removed the common law prohibition against assigning an existing personal injury claim to the extent of permitting enforcement of such a claim in the hands of an insurer as statutory subrogee of the insured. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vargas, 157 Ariz. 17, 754 P.2d 346 (Ct. App. 1988).

H. Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages are separate and distinct and apply to different accident situations. Underinsured motorist coverage shall not provide coverage for a claim against an uninsured motorist in addition to any applicable uninsured motorist coverage. If multiple policies or coverages purchased by one insured on different vehicles apply to an accident or claim, the insurer may limit the coverage so that only one policy or coverage, selected by the insured, shall be applicable to any one accident. If the policy does not contain a statement that informs the insured of the insured’s right to select one policy or coverage as required by this subsection, within thirty days after the insurer receives notice of an accident, the insurer shall notify the insured in writing of the insured’s right to select one policy or coverage. For the purposes of this subsection, “insurer” includes every insurer within a group of insurers under a common management.

I. Insurers that make payments for damages to insureds for uninsured motorist coverage may subrogate and sue for reimbursement of the total amount of the payments in the name of the insured against any uninsured motorist responsible for the damages to the insured.

The right to subrogation established by subsection (I) is merely an assignment of an existing claim, and is subject to the statute of limitations applicable to that claim. Safeway Ins. Co. v. Collins, 192 Ariz. 262, 963 P.2d 1085 (Ct. App. 1998).

J. Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability insurer that makes a payment under the medical payments coverage of a motor vehicle insurance policy to or on behalf of any insured for an injury that arises out of an accident that occurs after December 31, 1998 may have a lien against any amount in excess of five thousand dollars that is paid to or on behalf of that insured under the medical payments coverage of the policy for that accident. The insurer shall compromise the lien in a fair and equitable manner. In order to perfect a lien granted pursuant to this subsection, within sixty days after issuing a payment that is more than five thousand dollars to the insured under medical payments coverage, the insurer or the insurer’s authorized representative shall record in the office of the recorder of the county in which the accident occurred a written statement that sets forth the name and address of the insured as they appear in the records of the insurer, the name and address of the insurer at the insurer’s principal office in this state, the amount claimed pursuant to this subsection and, to the best of the insurer’s knowledge, the names and addresses of all persons, firms and corporations and their insurance carriers that the insured or the insured’s legal representative alleges are liable for damages arising from the accident. Within five days after recording the lien, the insurer shall also mail a copy of the lien, postage prepaid, to the insured and to each person, firm and corporation and their insurance carriers alleged to be liable for damages at the address given in the statement. The recording of the lien is notice of the lien to all persons, firms and corporations that are liable for damages regardless of whether they are named in the lien. The recorder shall endorse on the lien recorded pursuant to this subsection the date and hour of receipt and all facts that are necessary to indicate that the lien has been recorded. The lien may be amended to reflect payments to the insured made after the lien is recorded. Within thirty days after the lien is satisfied, the lienholder shall issue and record a release of the lien.

K. Any common law prohibition against assignments of causes of action for personal injuries is abrogated to the extent provided in subsection I of this section.

L. An insurer is not required to offer, provide or make available coverage conforming to this section in connection with any general commercial liability policy, excess policy, umbrella policy or other policy that does not provide primary motor vehicle insurance for liabilities arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of a specifically insured motor vehicle.

M. If an insured makes a bodily injury or death claim under uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage based on an accident that involved an unidentified motor vehicle and no physical contact with the motor vehicle occurred, the insured shall provide corroboration that the unidentified motor vehicle caused the accident. For the purposes of this subsection, “corroboration” means any additional and confirming testimony, fact or evidence that strengthens and adds weight or credibility to the insured’s representation of the accident.

Rule 8.1. Priorities in scheduling criminal cases

a. Priority of Criminal Trials. The trial of criminal cases shall have priority over the trial of civil cases. Any scheduling conflicts will be resolved in accordance with Rule 5(j), Uniform Rules of Practice .

b. Preferences. The trial of defendants in custody and defendants whose pretrial liberty may present unusual risks shall be given preference over other criminal cases.

c. Duty of Prosecutor. The prosecutor shall advise the court of facts relevant to determining the order of cases on the calendar.

d. Duty of Defense Counsel. The defendant’s counsel shall advise the court of the impending expiration of time limits in the defendant’s case. Failure to do so may result in sanctions and should be considered by the court in determining whether to dismiss an action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 8.6 .

e. Extraordinary Cases. Within 25 days after the arraignment in Superior Court either party may apply in writing to the court for a hearing to establish extraordinary circumstances requiring the suspension of Rule 8 in a particular case. Within 5 days of the receipt of the application the court shall hold the hearing and make findings of fact. The findings shall be immediately transmitted to the Chief Justice who may approve or decline to approve them. Upon approval of the findings by the Chief Justice, they shall be returned to the trial court where upon motion of either party the trial court may suspend the provisions of Rule 8 and reset the trial date for a time certain.

Rule 8.2. Time limits

a. General. Subject to the provisions of Rule 8.4 , every person against whom an indictment, information or complaint is filed shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction of the offense within the following time periods:

(1) Defendants in Custody. 150 days from arraignment if the person is held” in custody”, except as provided in subsection (a), paragraph (3) of this section.

(2) Defendants Released From Custody. 180 days from arraignment if the person “is released” under Rule 7, except as provided in subsection (a), paragraph (3) of this section.

(3). Complex Cases. One year from arraignment for cases in which the indictment, information or complaint is filed between December 1, 2002 and December 1, 2005, and for subsequent cases 270 days from arraignment if the person is charged with any of the following:
(i) 1st Degree Murder, except as provided in paragraph (a)(4) of this rule,
(ii) Offenses that will require the court to consider evidence obtained as the result of an order permitting the interception of wire, electronic or oral communication,
(iii) Any complex cases as determined by a written factual finding by the court.

(4). Capital Cases. Eighteen months from arraignment, if the state files a notice of intent to seek the death penalty:

b. Waiver of Appearance at Arraignment. If a person has waived an appearance at arraignment pursuant to Rule 14.2 , the date of the arraignment held without the defendant’s presence shall be considered the arraignment date for purposes of subsection (a), paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of this rule.

c. New Trial. A trial ordered after a mistrial or upon a motion for a new trial shall commence within 60 days of the entry of the order of the court. A trial ordered upon the reversal of a judgment by an appellate court shall commence within 90 days of the service of the mandate of the Appellate Court.

d. Extension of Time Limits. These time limits may be extended pursuant to Rule 8.5 .

e. Trial Dates. In all superior court cases except those in which Rule 8 has been suspended pursuant to Rule 8.1 (e), the court shall, either at the time of arraignment in superior court or at a pretrial conference, set a trial date for a time certain.

Rule 8.3. Right to speedy trial of persons in prison within or without the state

a. Persons Without the State. Within 90 days after receipt of a written request from any person charged with a crime and incarcerated without the state, or within a reasonable time after otherwise learning of such person’s incarceration without the state, the prosecutor shall take action as required by law to obtain such person’s presence for trial. Within 90 days after the defendant has been delivered into the temporary custody of the appropriate authority of this state, he or she shall be brought to trial.

b. Persons Within the State.
(1) Any person who is imprisoned in this state may request final disposition of any untried indictment, information or complaint pending against the person in this state. The request shall be in writing addressed to the court in which the charge is filed and to the prosecutor charged with the duty of prosecuting it, and shall set forth the place of imprisonment.
(2) Within 30 days after a detainer has been filed against a prisoner incarcerated within this state, the prosecutor charged with the duty of prosecuting the charge from which the detainer results, shall inform the prisoner of the detainer and of the prisoner’s right to request its final disposition under Rule 8.3(b)(1).
(3) Within 90 days after sending such a request to the court and prosecutor, the prisoner shall be brought to trial upon the charge.
(4) The escape from custody of a prisoner subsequent to the prisoner’s request for final disposition of an untried indictment, information or complaint shall void the request.

Rule 8.4. Excluded periods

The following periods shall be excluded from the computation of the time limits set forth in Rules 8.2 and 8.3 :

a. Delays occasioned by or on behalf of the defendant, including, but not limited to, delays caused by an examination and hearing to determine competency or mental retardation, the defendant’s absence or incompetence, or his or her inability to be arrested or taken into custody in Arizona.

b. Delays resulting from a remand for new probable cause determination under Rules 5.5 or 12.9 .

c. Delays resulting from extension of the time for disclosure under Rule 15.6 .

d. Delays necessitated by congestion of the trial calendar, but only when the congestion is attributable to extraordinary circumstances, in which case the presiding judge shall promptly apply to the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court for suspension of any of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

e. Delays resulting from continuances in accordance with Rule 8.5 , but only for the time periods prescribed therein.

f. Delays resulting from joinder for trial with another defendant as to whom the time limits have not run when there is good cause for denying severance. In all other cases, severance should be granted to preserve the applicable time limits.

g. Delays resulting from the setting of a transfer hearing pursuant to Rule 40 of these rules.

Rule 8.5. Continuances

a. Form of Motion. A continuance of a trial may be granted on the motion of a party. Any motion must be in writing and state with specificity the reason(s) justifying the continuance.

b. Grounds for Motion. A continuance of any trial date shall be granted only upon a showing that extraordinary circumstances exist and that delay is indispensable to the interests of justice. A continuance may be granted only for so long as is necessary to serve the interests of justice. In ruling on a motion for continuance, the court shall consider the rights of the defendant and any victim to a speedy disposition of the case. If a continuance is granted, the court shall state the specific reasons for the continuance on the record.

c. Other Continuances. No further continuances shall be granted except as provided in Rules 8.1 (e), 8.2 (e) and 8.4 (d).

Rule 8.6. Denial of speedy trial

Violations. If the court determines after considering the exclusions of Rule 8.4 , that a time limit established by Rules 8.2(a), 8.2(b), 8.2(c), 8.2 (d), 8.3(a), 8.3(b)(2), or 8.3 (b)(3) has been violated, it shall on motion of the defendant, or on its own initiative, dismiss the prosecution with or without prejudice.

Rule 8.7. Acceleration of trial

Where special circumstances relating to the victim so warrant, the court may accelerate the trial to the earliest possible date that is consistent with the defendant’s right to a fair trial. If necessary, the presiding judge shall assign another judge of the court to preside at trial in order to insure that the trial commences as scheduled.